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
20 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Management Staff, DD/I  
Special Support Assistant, DD/A  
Executive Officer, DD/S&T  
✓ Administrative Officer, O/DCI

SUBJECT : Statement by Ambassador Richard M. Helms

1. On 16 January 1975, Ambassador Richard M. Helms provided a prepared statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. I have attached herewith a supply of xerox copies of the statement, for distribution within your Directorate, as considered appropriate. The Deputy Director for Administration discussed this matter with the Director.



Executive Officer  
Deputy Director for Administration

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Mr. Chairman,

We are here this morning for a straightforward purpose: to get at the facts bearing on the conduct of the Central Intelligence Agency in situations that have lately come under attack in certain quarters of the press and from some members of Congress.

All the members of this Committee have devoted much, if not all, of their professional lives to the public service. I ask for the privilege to speak to you across the familiar ground of a shared experience. Before becoming an Ambassador, I spent some thirty years in the Intelligence Service. For me and, I believe, for most of those who served with me in the Central Intelligence Agency, these were years of high meaning -- serious work in the American interest.

I was and remain proud of my work there, culminating in my six and a half years as Director. I believed in the importance to the nation of the function that the Agency served. I still do: without regrets, without qualms, without apology.

If then a feeling of pride should hereafter pervade what

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I have to say about my direction of the Agency and my exposition of its functions, I pray you will not interpret my attitude as self-serving. It is simply the way I feel about what I came to look upon not merely as a job, but rather as a calling -- a profession, regulated as all professions are, by scruples, by honor, and by duty. In addition, the needs of the President were paramount, within the bounds of a statutory charter.

And if I should yield to indignation in my comments on the public turmoil that now surrounds the Agency, it will be because I am indignant at the irresponsible attacks made upon the true ends of the intelligence function -- attacks which, if suffered to pass unchallenged, could seriously damage the interests of the United States by impairing its ability to live safely in a world too much of which remains locked off in closed, fortress-like states.

The function -- the work, that is -- of the Central Intelligence Agency is well spelled out in the National Security Act of 1947, the same Act that gave rise to the Defense Department as we know it today. That law was passed after much debate. It has endured the test of time and nearly three decades of international turbulence. Basically, the charge

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laid upon the Agency, its controlling mission, is to collect, synthesize and evaluate information associated with foreign happenings that affect the national security. The finished product is passed directly to the President and the relatively few members of his staff who are responsible for the conduct of our foreign policy and national defense. It so happens that the word "foreign" does not appear in the Act. Yet there never has been any question about the intent of the Congress to confine the Agency's intelligence function to foreign matters. All the Directors from the start -- and Mr. Colby is the eighth in the succession -- have operated on the clear understanding that the Agency's reason for being was to collect intelligence abroad. The boundary has always been plain to them and to their staffs.

Those of us who were in one or another of the national intelligence services during the Second World War remember well that when General Donovan first put forward the concept of a peacetime intelligence service agency in 1944, the idea was attacked in the press as a device for fastening a Gestapo on the nation. It was precisely for the purpose of banishing

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such fears, however groundless, that the language of the founding Act specifies that the Central Intelligence Agency would have no police, law enforcement, or subpoena power, and no internal security function. To my certain knowledge, all the Directors of Central Intelligence in their turn accepted the division of the foreign and domestic intelligence and security tasks as an absolute -- a separation confirmed by the mandate of Congress. Our work lay in foreign fields.

So that there may be no misunderstanding, we all know that just as photographic satellites are launched from American soil, a considerable portion of our effort is based in this country. The Agency is charged with collecting foreign intelligence domestically from United States citizens or residents traveling abroad. Overseas activities may need a home base in this country and in any case are basically administered from headquarters in Virginia, where also are the bulk of our analytical and estimative personnel. As I will describe in a minute, the interface with the Federal Bureau of Investigation is continuous and we have never in any way challenged their jurisdiction. And finally the Director of

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Central Intelligence has the statutory responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. But in all this the target remains abroad.

How then do we account for the phenomenon that finds an Agency so chartered under a drum-fire of attack for allegedly engaging in domestic espionage and other illegal actions, in defiance of its statutory constraints?

There are, in my observation, two reasons for that.

One is that the American people in general and the press as an institution have traditionally been skeptical of any government operation that is carried on in secrecy, especially in peace time. That distrust is a healthy one and the intelligence services should accept such skepticism as an inescapable occupational hazard. They are themselves, after all, essentially reporting services. Whenever they fail to read the signs correctly, or whenever they are guilty of some misfeasance in the conduct of their business, the press has a right, indeed a duty, to take them to task.

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This brings me to the second reason. The current attack aimed at the Agency was in my opinion irresponsible.

The principal allegations remain unsupported and, to the contrary, have been undermined by contrary evidence identified by the press itself. Yet these allegations, picked up and carried to the four corners of the earth, have brought undeserved embarrassment and humiliation to the patriotic and dedicated men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency. And they seriously damage, at least temporarily, the function the Agency is charged with performing in the national interest.

We in the intelligence community and the press in its world are both in the business of reporting information in the public interest. I say in all seriousness that for some of the press to pound the public with such a farrago of charges can only result in scarring the reputation of an arm of the government without serving a useful purpose.

I offer, if I may, another observation. It is that quite apart from the question of the motives that may or may not have

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fostered the attack on the Agency, the press plainly lacked a firm understanding of the practices and precepts of American intelligence. I see now, in hindsight, a fairly urgent need for educating the press, and through the press the American people, in the not particularly arcane distinctions that exist in the intelligence community. If my estimate is correct, it took the more responsible elements of the press a full fortnight to grasp what has actually gone on inside the different parts of that community. If this <sup>distinguished</sup> ~~learned~~ Panel should agree with me that much of ruinous misunderstandings of these past weeks could have been avoided if only the intelligence function had been more widely understood, then perhaps you will find a way to make certain the confusion will not be repeated.

To begin with, there is the matter of straightening out the public conception of the various bodies that make up the intelligence community, the boundaries that separate them, and the common concerns they share. It is well known, to be sure, that our total Federal intelligence effort is both extensive and expensive. Not so well known is the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency's fraction of the total machinery, in terms



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of money, is only about 15 per cent. The bulk of its budget is spent on the collection and assessment of information. In contrast, the counterintelligence side, the side that seems most to fascinate our critics, is small both in budget and in people. It has the highly professional job of detecting and countering foreign efforts to penetrate and subvert our institutions and policies. In this task the counterintelligence branch must by law and necessity work closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The F. B. I. handles the counterintelligence function inside our shores. The C. I. A. does the job abroad. Manifestly, since agents come and go, there has to be a continuous interchange of information between the two organizations, and an exchange of files as well. Trust and confidence are the sovereign coinage in this work. One simply cannot pass such valuable people as identified foreign agents to and fro between the foreign and the home systems as the international and domestic air carriers do with their passengers. Our sources of intelligence would not last long if we were that indifferent.

I have a last point to make. In normal times few

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Americans would ever come within the purview of our foreign intelligence operations. That happened only when evidence appeared of their involvement with subversive elements abroad. Until the recent past, such involvements were rare occurrences. Then in the late 1950's and early 1960's came the sudden and quite dramatic upsurge of extreme radicalism in this country and abroad, an uprush of violence against authority and institution, and the advocacy of violent change in our system of government.

By and in itself, this violence, this dissent, this radicalism were of no direct concern to the Central Intelligence Agency. It became so only in the degree that the trouble was inspired by, or coordinated with, or funded by, anti-American subversion mechanisms abroad. In such event the C.I.A. had a real, a clear and proper function to perform, but in collaboration with the F.B.I. The Agency did perform that function in response to the express concern of the President. And information was indeed developed, largely by the F.B.I. and the Department of Justice, but also from foreign sources as well, that the agitation here did in fact have some overseas

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connections. As the work load grew, a very small group within the already small Counter Intelligence Staff was formed to analyze the information developed here and to give guidance to our facilities abroad. As you can see from the material furnished by the Agency, the charter of this group was specifically restricted to the foreign field. How, then, is it possible to distort this effort into a picture of massive domestic spying?

That finishes my prepared statement.